WILL SOUTHERN AGRICULTURE PLAY A ROLE IN A CARBON MARKET? by Zeuli, Kimberly A. & Skees, Jerry R.
Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, 32,2(August  2000):235-248
©  2000 Southern  Agricultural  Economics  Association
Will  Southern Agriculture Play  a Role  in  a
Carbon Market?
Kimberly A.  Zeuli and Jerry R.  Skees
ABSTRACT
While a  carbon  market  offers  substantial opportunities  for US  agriculture,  regional  differ-
ences  in such a market are often  ignored.  This  paper focuses  on the  advantages  and chal-
lenges  for agriculture  in  the South.  The potential  of two promising  options  are  analyzed:
conversion  from  cropland  to forests  and  greater  use  of conservation  tillage.  It  is  argued
that the right institutional  arrangements  can  overcome  three fundamental  challenges  to an
efficient  carbon  market:  transaction  costs,  risk,  and perverse  incentives.  Some  examples
are  given,  such as  the use  of a  farmer-owned  organization  and  the provision  of land use
and  carbon  information by the  government.
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In  1997, the Kyoto Protocol to the United Na-
tions  Framework  Convention  on  Climate
Change called for developed nations  to reduce
six greenhouse  gas  (GHG) emissions,  includ-
ing  carbon  dioxide.  The  Protocol,  if  ratified,
would  require  developed  nations  to  reduce
GHG  emissions  by  5  percent  of  1990  levels
by  the  year  2012.  The  United  States  has  al-
ready  agreed  to reduce  GHG  emissions  by 7
percent  of  1990  levels  by  2012.  To  achieve
emission reductions,  the Protocol  (Article  17)
permits  countries  to  use  market-based  emis-
sion  trades  to  fulfill  their  reduction  commit-
ments.
One of the Protocol's missions  is to create
a market  for  trading  over  one billion  tons  of
carbon  reductions  per  year  (Totten).  Many
governments,  large  companies,  and  other
agents,  however,  are  not  willing  to  wait  for
Protocol  ratification;  a  neophyte  carbon mar-
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ket is already emerging.  Several  major oil and
electric  utility  companies,  including  Royal
Dutch Shell and BP-Amoco,  have  already be-
gun  to  trade  greenhouse  gas  emissions,  and
legislation to reduce  and cap CO2 emissions is
pending  in the  US  and other countries  (Envi-
ronmental  Defense  Fund;  Parker).  "These
firms  are  the  first  to  see  that  fixing  global
warming  could  give  rise  to  the  world's  next
trillion-dollar  industry:  the  greenhouse  gas
trade"  (The Economist,  p.  73).  They are  also
being  risk  averse,  taking  the  initiative  in  es-
tablishing early emission reduction credits pri-
or to regulation,  hoping that paying some now
will mean paying  less later (Romm).1
Carbon  emission  reductions  can  occur  in
two  general  ways:  directly  via  reductions  in
emissions from firms (e.g.,  utilizing improved
firm-level  technology  or  finding  alternatives
1Taking  action  against  global  warming  may  also
help a firm's image (i.e., by being socially responsible),
which could translate into higher share values. Further,
the reduction  credits could increase in value if a carbon
market  emerges.Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, August 2000
for the  use of fossil fuels) and natural sources,
such  as  forests,  and  indirectly  by  off-setting
emissions  with  carbon  units  stored  in  natural
sinks.
2 Carbon  is  stored  naturally  in  many
sources:  oceans,  fossil  fuel  deposits,  the  ter-
restrial  system  (rocks,  soil,  forests,  wetlands,
etc.),  and  the  atmosphere  (Sedjo,  Sohngen,
and Jagger).  Currently,  the Protocol only  rec-
ognizes  the  use of forests  as carbon  sinks (Ar-
ticle  3.3),  although the wording  in Article  3.4
leaves open the possibility of accepting the use
of agricultural  soil  sinks  (Bruce  et al.).
The  US  agricultural  sector,  which  offers
substantial  carbon  sequestration  opportunities,
could  clearly  profit  from  emission  reduction
efforts.  This  paper  analyzes  the  potential  of
the two most promising  options:  (1) land con-
version from crop production or pasture to for-
ests (afforestation),  and (2) greater use of con-
servation  tillage.3 Section  2  explores  the
carbon  reduction  potential  of forests  and  ag-
ricultural  soil,  providing  a  well-documented
review  of  current  literature  on  these  topics.
Section  3 focuses  on  economic  considerations
and  estimates.  The  discussion  in  Sections  2
and  3  raises  the  issue  of regional  differences
in terms  of carbon  sequestration  potential and
costs.
It  is  generally  believed  that  substantial
amounts  of  marginal  agricultural  land  and
growing  season  conditions  suitable  for  pro-
ducing  fast-growing  southern  pine  varieties
gives  the South the best opportunities  for car-
bon  sequestration  forest  programs  in  the  US
(Alig,  Adams,  and  McCarl;  Sedjo  and  Solo-
mon).  The probable comparative  advantage  of
the  South  in  a  carbon  market  is  explored
2 Totten and others also note  that it may be possible
to  de-carbonize  fossil  fuels  to  produce  hydrogen  in-
stead  of CO:.  Although  this  would  clearly  have  great
potential in carbon  reduction, this paper only considers
the  more  mainstream  and viable  carbon  sequestration
options.
3 Although  agriculture  could  also  participate  in  a
carbon  market  through  other means,  such  as  the  pro-
duction  of  biomass  crops  or  carbon  sequestration  in
crops,  we do not  consider these options  since their po-
tential  currently  seems  more  limited  than  land conver-
sion and  soil conservation  (Dumanski  et al.).
throughout these sections.4 Other than regional
disparities  in  soil,  climate,  and  tree  species,
differences  in other agricultural characteristics
will necessitate  a more regionally  focused car-
bon  market  implementation  strategy.  The  is-
sues  surrounding the implementation  of a car-
bon  market  are  discussed  in  more  detail  in
Section 4. The discussion centers on three fun-
damental  challenges  to  an  efficient  and equi-
table  carbon  market:  transaction  costs,  risk,
and  perverse  incentives.  A  carbon-trading
scheme  already  in  operation  is  used  to  illus-
trate  how  these  challenges  are  surmountable
with the right institutional  arrangements.
Estimating the  Carbon Sequestration
Potential of Forests and Conservation
Tillage
It is generally  agreed that forests  and agricul-
tural soil offer the greatest potential for carbon
sinks,  but there  is  no consensus  regarding  the
level  of  carbon  that  ultimately  could  be  se-
questered.  Numerous  scientific  studies  have
been devoted  to such  estimates,  but  measure-
ment estimates  vary widely and are difficult to
compare  since  assumptions,  methods,  and
units  of measurement  usually  differ. The  first
part  of this  section  reviews  the literature  and
attempts to find a range of consistent estimates
regarding  carbon  sequestration  rates  and total
carbon  stored  for  both  forests  and  soil.  The
lack of consistent  measurement  is often  con-
sidered  a major barrier  to the formation of an
efficient  carbon  market,  a  conclusion  that  is
somewhat refuted in the latter half of this sec-
tion.  Complete  accuracy  may  not  be  neces-
sary.
Forests
The  US  forest  sector  maintains  a  net  uptake
of  carbon  (i.e.,  it  stores  more  carbon  than  it
releases),  although the level  of net uptake has
4The  South,  as  used  in  this  paper,  refers  to  the
following  13  states:  Alabama,  Arkansas,  Florida, Geor-
gia,  Kentucky,  Louisiana,  Mississippi,  North Carolina,
Oklahoma,  South Carolina, Tennessee,  Texas, and Vir-
ginia.
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been declining  since  1990 (EPA).5 In 1996, the
forest  sector was  responsible  for a  net uptake
of  208.6  million metric  tons  (MMT)6 of car-
bon equivalent  (EPA).  It is estimated  that ap-
proximately  52.5  billion  MT  of  carbon  are
stored  in  US  forests  (Birdsey,  1992).  Forest
ecosystems  sequester  carbon  through  trees
(living trees,  standing dead trees, roots,  stems,
branches,  and  foliage),  understory  vegetation
(shrubs and bushes), the forest floor (wood de-
bris,  tree  litter,  and humus)  and the soil. 7 The
net sequestration estimates  of the forest sector
also  account  for  the  carbon  stored  in  wood
products  and  landfill  wood,  which  is  appro-
priate given that the final  end-use of harvested
timber is  an important  variable  in  carbon  se-
questration  estimates.  For  example,  lumber
that is used  for houses, especially  if it is from
older  trees,  can  sequester  carbon  for  a  long
period  (Heath et al.  and Sedjo  and Solomon).
Unfortunately,  the  inclusion  (or  omission)  of
this  variable  further  complicates  comparisons
of carbon  sequestration estimates.
In  the  average  US  forest,  trees  and  tree
roots  only account for  about  31  percent of all
forest  carbon;  59  percent  of all  forest  carbon
is stored in the soil (Birdsey,  1992).  Trees con-
tinually  store  additional  carbon  until  they
reach  maturity,  at  which  point  their  carbon
stores  remain  relatively  static.  Since  younger
trees  sequester  carbon  at  a  much  faster  rate
than  mature  trees,  carbon  accumulation  rates
will be higher for newly planted and harvested
forests  than  for  preserved  forests  (Hunting-
ton).  The  relationship  between  forest  age and
total  carbon  stores  is  the  opposite:  younger,
harvested  forests have less total carbon stored
than  older,  less-disturbed  forests.  In addition
to forest  age,  tree species  and climate also af-
fect total  carbon  storage  levels  and sequestra-
5 Forests  are  a  net  sink  for carbon  in  the  US  be-
cause there  is little net  deforestation  (Lal et al.).
6 Comparisons  across studies are difficult given that
each  study  uses  either  metric  tons,  American  (short)
tons,  or British (long) tons  and often does  not specify
which  unit  is in  use.  Units for this  publication  reflect
those  used in the cited source.
7 For an excellent  description of the functioning of
forest ecosystems  as carbon  sinks  see Sedjo,  Sohngen,
and Jagger.
tion rates.  For example,  the rate of carbon  ac-
cumulation in live trees increases with the rate
of volume  growth,  a  trait  more  dominant  in
some tree species than others (Birdsey,  1992).
Furthermore,  cooler,  wetter  climates  result  in
greater soil carbon  sequestration rates. Climate
also  partially  dictates  forest  type  (e.g.,  hard-
wood  species are pervasive in northern states).
The  connection  between  climate  and  car-
bon sequestration results in regional differenc-
es in carbon  storage estimates. Of the total car-
bon  stored  in  US  forests  (excluding  Alaska),
the  greatest  proportion  (about  21  percent)  is
contained  in  southern  forests  (Birdsey,  1992),
a  result  directly  tied  to  the  South's  vast  for-
estland  (discussed  in  more  detail  below).  In
terms  of  carbon  stored  per  forest  acre,  the
South  does  not  fair  as  well.  On  average,  the
South  stores  about  120,000  pounds of carbon
per acre,  compared  to  an average  of  165,000
pounds  per  acre  in  northern  states  and  a
158,000  pounds-per-acre  national  average
(Birdsey,  1992).  The northern  states have sub-
stantially  more  carbon  stored  on  the  forest
floor and in the soil because of the climate and
somewhat more carbon stored in trees because
the  region's  forests  are  older  and  less  dis-
turbed.  However,  most  of  the  nation's  fast
growing  and young  tree  plantations  are in the
South,  giving the region  the greatest potential
for  rapid  increases  in  forest  carbon  stock
(Alig,  Adams  and McCarl).
The  carbon sequestration  potential  of con-
verting  agricultural  land into  forests has  been
widely  studied. The total potential  carbon  se-
questration  of any converted  agricultural  land
is  simply  calculated  by  multiplying  the  ex-
pected  forest  carbon sequestration  rate by  the
amount of land converted.  Clearly,  deviations
in either variable will result in different carbon
sequestration  estimates.  McCarl  and  Schnei-
der's  comparison  of  14  afforestation  carbon
sequestration studies  shows the results of such
deviations.  The  carbon  sequestration  rates
ranged  from 0  to 73  MMT  annually  and 0  to
2,900 MMT total. Comparing estimates across
studies  is  difficult  since  they  are  contingent
upon  numerous  assumptions  and  constraints.
For  example,  according  to  Lal et al. an  aver-
age rate  of carbon accumulation  in afforested
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agricultural  land  is 550,000 pounds  of carbon
per acre  per  year.  However,  this  rate assumes
new  forests  and no  timber  harvests  and is  an
average  across the nation.  Any changes  in  as-
sumptions  regarding  tree  species,  timber  har-
vesting,  land condition, previous  land use, and
climate  will  affect the  sequestration rate.  Fur-
ther,  some  studies  include  total forest  ecosys-
tem  carbon  estimates  (i.e.,  carbon  stored  in
soil,  understory  vegetation,  etc.)  while  others
only  account for  the carbon  stored  in trees.
Conservation Tillage
Although  currently  most  agricultural  soils  in
the  US  are  no  longer  significant  sources  of
CO2 emissions,  recent estimates  show agricul-
tural soil as  a net emitter of carbon:  5.9 MMT
of  carbon  equivalent  were  emitted  in  1996
(Bruce et al.; EPA; and Lal et al.). Historical-
ly,  land converted  to crop  production,  as  well
as  intensive  tillage  practices,  resulted  in  sig-
nificant carbon  emissions  (Lal et al.). Thus, it
is estimated  that US croplands have the poten-
tial to reduce US CO2 emissions by  15  percent
through  soil  carbon  sequestration  (Lal  et al.).
Current accounts  estimate 15,600 MMT of soil
organic  carbon  (SOC)  stocks  in  US  agricul-
tural  soil (Lal et al.) Soil carbon  sequestration
can be accomplished through the increased use
of best management practices  (BMPs), such as
conservation  tillage  (no till and minimum till),
reduction  in pesticides  and fertilizers,  nutrient
management,  and  precision  farming.  Farmers
can  also  plant  buffer  strips  and  other  cover
crops  that would  add to the carbon  sequestra-
tion  potential  of the  soil.
However  important  the  other methods  ul-
timately may be, current interest is focused on
the  potential  of  conservation  tillage,  which
could  result  in  significant  soil  carbon  accu-
mulation  (Bruce  et al., Paustian  et al.,  Twee-
ten, Sohngen,  and Hopkins).  Lal et al. estimate
that US cropland has the potential to sequester
75-208  MMT  of carbon  per year through bet-
ter  management  (Lal  et al.). While  minimum
tillage  practices will reduce the amount of car-
bon  released  into  the  atmosphere,  no-till  will
actually  increase  carbon  sequestration  (Kern
and  Johnson;  Tweeten,  Sohngen,  and  Hop-
kins). Paustian  et al.'s summary of 27 studies,
mostly  in  the US,  found  that  on  average  no-
till soil sequesters  3  tons  per hectare per  year
and carbon accumulation  rates range from  -4
to  +10  tons  per  hectare  (Tweeten,  Sohngen,
and  Jagger).  The  upward  limit  for carbon  se-
questration  with improved  soil management is
estimated to be about  5 billion MT of carbon,
a  level  that may  take  as  long as  a  century  to
achieve  (Bruce et al.).
As  with  forestry,  carbon  sequestration  es-
timates  for  agricultural  soil  are  not  always
consistent across studies (Barnwell et al.). The
amount  of carbon  sequestered  in  agricultural
soil  is  determined  by  the  interaction  of  cli-
mate,  soil properties,  land-use,  and agricultur-
al  management  practices  (EPA;  Kern  and
Johnson; and Dick et al.). In addition to tillage
practices,  the  types  of  crop  being  produced,
the use  of crop  rotation and  cover crops,  ero-
sion, drainage, and fertilization also impact net
soil carbon sequestration  (Dick et al., Duman-
ski  et al.,  EPA).  Temperate  regions  store  the
greatest  soil  carbon  (Bruce  et  al.,  EPA).  As
with trees,  soils with carbon stores below their
maximum  carbon  sequestration level  (i.e., car-
bon-depleted  or young  soils) have the greatest
potential  to sequester additional  carbon (Bruce
et al.; Kern  and Johnson).  Differences  in  cli-
mate  and  agricultural  management  practices
thus lead  to regional  disparities  in soil carbon
sequestration rates  and totals.
Is Inconsistent Estimation a Barrier?
The previous  discussion  reveals that estimates
of  carbon  sequestration  rates  and  carbon  se-
questration  totals  for  forests  and  agricultural
soil  vary  widely.  Carbon  accumulation  rates
and  levels  of total  carbon  stored  depend  on
climate, tree species,  soil and tree age,  and nu-
merous other variables,  making consistent na-
tional estimates impossible.  Consistent nation-
al estimates  (or averages)  should not, however,
at this point be considered a barrier to a carbon
market.  Carbon  sequestration  rates  will  have
to be measured  on a regional or perhaps much
smaller  scale to be accurate (thus,  creating ac-
curate  inconsistencies).  For  example,  to
achieve a truly accurate estimate of soil carbon
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sequestration  rates  for  a  single  farm,  one
might have  to  make several  measurements  to
account for variations in soil, grade, crops, etc.
Clearly,  the  measurement  accuracy  is  dimin-
ished  the  more  it  is  extrapolated  to  cover
neighboring  farms,  even  within  a  certain  re-
gion.  The  science  of estimation  also contains
some measurement error (i.e.,  measurement of
carbon  remains  a  challenge,  subject  to  esti-
mation  and  technological  error),  although
some  argue  that  measurement  uncertainty  is
often overstated  (Totten).
Regardless,  measurement  error may  not be
a  barrier  to  an  efficient  carbon  market,  since
insurance  and  contract  mechanisms  could  be
developed  that  would  account  for  this  error.
For  example,  farmers  within  a  fairly homog-
enous  region  could receive  an average  carbon
sequestration  rate  per  acre  with the  adoption
of  no-till.  As  long  as  market  regulators  ac-
cepted  this  average,  with  the  knowledge  that
it represented  a  range of expected  carbon  se-
questration  rates,  no  further precise  measure-
ment  would  be  needed.  Markets  can  accept
some uncertainty  and  still function  efficiently.
What  is  known  with  certainty  is  that  the
US  contains  vast  forest  and  agricultural  soil
resources  that  could  become  major  carbon
sinks:  over  700  million  acres  of  forest  (over
400  million on  private  land)  and  375  million
acres  of  cropland  (USDA  1997c;  USDA
1997d).  The  South  alone  contains  over  214
million  acres  of forest,  29  percent of the  na-
tion's total forestland (USDA  1997c). It is also
clear that land-use patterns  are dynamic. From
1982  to  1997,  cropland  decreased  by 46 mil-
lion  acres  (most  of  which  was  enrolled  in
CRP)  and  non-federal forestland  increased  by
800,000  acres,  trends  that mask  annual  shifts
and  regional  variations  in  land-use  (USDA
1997d).  The  EPA  estimates  average  fluctua-
tions in forestland  acreage to be about 0.1  per-
cent  a  year.  Cropland  acreage  in the Southern
Plains (Oklahoma  and Texas) jumped 7.4 per-
cent from 1996 to 1997,  a leap more than three
times  greater  than  any  other  region  (USDA
1997b).  Land  owners  transfer  land  among
competing  uses  depending  on  economic  and
environmental  (e.g.,  crop  rotations  to  sustain
soil resources)  incentives,  thus  supporting the
feasibility  of a carbon market dependent upon
land-use  changes.  This may be especially true
in the South, where approximately 20-30 mil-
lion  acres  represent marginal agricultural land
unsuitable  for cultivation,  but  appropriate  for
forestland (NRCS; Alig, Adams, and McCarl).
Increased  adoption  of  conservation  tillage
also  seems  likely,  given past producer  trends.
In  1996,  36  percent  of cropland  was  already
under  conservation  tillage,  15  percent  under
no-till  (USDA 1997a).  In addition to environ-
mental concerns  and regulations,  farmers have
responded  to potentially  higher profits:  yields
may  increase  while  production  costs may  de-
crease  (Day  et al.,  USDA  1997a).  Farm pro-
grams in  1985 and  1996 also required farmers
to  implement  conservation  practices  before
they  could  receive  government  payments.
There  is  clearly  potential,  especially  in  the
South,  for  further  conservation  tillage  adop-
tion since  the owners  of two-thirds  of the na-
tion's cropland have yet to adopt it. The  South
lags  behind  the  nation  in  total  conservation
tillage adoption;  10 percent or less of cropland
in most  southern  states  is under conservation
tillage  (USDA  1997a).  However,  the propor-
tion of no-till to all conservation  tillage meth-
ods is higher than the national average in most
southern  states  (USDA  1997a).
The  more important  challenge  to  a carbon
market raised by the previous discussion is the
negative  relationship  between  total  carbon
stored and carbon accumulation.  If the carbon
market  rewards  carbon  accumulation  more
than  established  carbon  sinks, rational  agents
will  plow  up  soil  and  harvest  mature  forests
to  make  room  for  more  "new"  carbon.  Fur-
thermore,  soil  carbon  sequestration  efforts
may  be  favored  over  afforestation  projects
since  soil  has  the  potential  for much  longer
periods  of  carbon  accumulation:  50-140
years,  as  compared  to  forests  which  achieve
maximum carbon sequestration in  15-30 years
(Barnwell  et al.; Lal  et  al.).  And  yet,  in  the
long run,  forests could be greater carbon sinks
(i.e.,  achieving greater carbon stores per acre).
Even where forest  strategies  would be imple-
mented,  the  bias  would  be  towards  planting
trees with shorter rotations (softwood rotations
average 25-40 years and hardwood about 40-
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60  years)  rather  than  those  with  the  greatest
total  carbon  storage  potential  (hardwoods).
Carbon  accumulation  represents  a  short-term
objective,  since  it  will  offset  current  CO2
emissions.  Focusing  on  established  carbon
sinks  is  clearly  a  long-run  strategy,  since  ul-
timately more carbon will be stored if it is not
periodically  released.  The  ultimate  challenge
for  a  carbon  market  is  to  create  new  carbon
sinks  via land-use  changes  without  losing es-
tablished  sinks,  an  issue  discussed  in  greater
detail  below.
How  much  will  it cost?
Given  the  wide  array  of  sequestration  esti-
mates,  it is  not  surprising  that assessments  of
carbon market prices  vary from  $15 per ton to
$348  per  ton  (Sandor  and  Skees).  Narrowing
the  focus  to  the  specific  costs  of  carbon  se-
questration  based  on  converting  agricultural
land to forest and conservation tillage does not
provide  any  additional  convergence  of  esti-
mates.
Agricultural Land Conversion to Forests
For a  detailed  comparison  of studies  estimat-
ing the costs of converting  agricultural  land to
forests,  the reader  is  referred  to  the works  of
Tweeten,  Sohngen,  and  Hopkins  and  McCarl
and Schneider,  both of which compare  numer-
ous previous studies. The estimates range from
$1  to $145 per ton of carbon, with $25 per ton
being  a rough average.  The wide  variation re-
sults  in  part  from  different  assumptions  re-
garding carbon  sequestration rates, amounts of
carbon  sequestered,  the  ability  to harvest  the
timber,  total  land  requirements,  interest  rates,
etc.  (Adams  et al.,  1998).  An  important  criti-
cism of several  studies  is their  reliance on the
price  of prevailing  agricultural rents  to deter-
mine the cost of conversion  (Plantinga, Maul-
din,  and  Miller).  This  method  ignores  other
possible income streams and opportunity costs
(e.g.,  recreation)  from  the  land  as  well as  ad-
ditional  compensation  costs.  The  payment  to
farmers  may  have  to  exceed  lost  agricultural
rents  since  the  decision  to  convert  land  is  in
the  short-term  irreversible,  creating  an option
value for keeping  land in agriculture  (Plantin-
ga,  Mauldin,  and  Miller).  Moreover,  farmers
may  have  to  either  acquire  forestry  manage-
ment  skills  or  hire  a  forest  manager.  Oppor-
tunity  cost  estimates  derived  from  current
land-use  allocations  (i.e.,  the  acreage  of  for-
estry versus agriculture)  using an econometric
model  may  help  resolve  these  limitations
(Plantinga,  Mauldin,  and  Miller;  Stavins).
However,  even if the appropriate land uses are
recognized,  opportunity  cost  estimates  may
still  be wrong.  For example,  Sedjo,  Sohngen,
and Jagger point  out that the opportunity cost
of remote forests are often overestimated since
they  include  high  timber  extraction  costs,
which  are  not  an  issue in  establishing  perma-
nent  forest carbon  sinks.
While  the  limitations  of  these  studies  are
important  to recognize,  this body  of literature
provides  some important  insights into prelim-
inary  costs  of  a  forest  carbon  sequestration
program.  For  instance,  most  argue  that  in-
creasing  marginal costs  will plague  land  con-
version  (Parks  and  Hardie;  Adams  et  al.,
1993).  Increasing  the  amount  of  acreage  de-
voted  to  forest will  ultimately  lead  to  the in-
corporation  of  primary  agricultural  land,
which  would  have  higher  rents.  Ultimately
great land conversion  out of agriculture could
lead  to  higher  food  prices  and,  thus,  higher
land  prices  (Adams  et  al.,  1993).  Also,  it
seems  most  likely  that  forest  conversion  will
occur primarily on  marginal  cropland,  as  that
is where it will  be most  competitive  (i.e.,  the
opportunity  cost  of  lost  yield  on  marginal
lands will be lower). The historic record of the
Conservation  Reserve  Program  (CRP)  sup-
ports this  theory.
The  CRP record  in the  South  suggests the
potential land-allocation relationship and land-
conversion price between cropland  and forest-
land for that region.  Of the total US acres  en-
rolled in CRP during  1986-93,  nine of the ten
states  which  enrolled  the  greatest  percentage
of  acreage  planted  to  trees  are  located  in the
South  (CRP  database).  In  Georgia,  almost  90
percent  of the state's  CRP acres  were  planted
to trees (Table  1).  The  average rental rates re-
quired by farmers in the South to switch from
crops  to  trees  ranged  from  $38  in  Florida  to
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Table  1.  Selective  CRP  statistics  for  the
South  and the US  during  1986-93
Average  % CRP  Land
State  Rental  Rate  Planted to Trees
Alabama  $43  51%
Arkansas  $48  54%
Florida  $38  86%
Georgia  $43  89%
Kentucky  $58  (less than  1%)
Louisiana  $44  35%
Mississippi  $43  57%
North Carolina  $46  56%
Oklahoma  $44  (less than  1%)
South Carolina  $43  75%
Tennessee  $50  5%
Texas  $39  (less than  1%)
Virginia  $53  36%
US  $53  6%
Source:  USDA,  ERS,  CRP  data  base  http://usda.
mannlib.cornell.edu/data-sets/land/89003.
$58  in  Kentucky  (Table  1).  It  is important  to
understand  the limitations  of these rental rate
estimates.  The  CRP  bidding  process  went
through  a  number  of  adjustments  during  its
operation.  Bids  in  the  earlier  phases  were
probably  higher  than  they  needed  to  be  to
achieve  land  conversion.  Therefore,  the  aver-
age  rental  values  reported  in  Table  1 might
overestimate  the  true  marginal  costs  of  land
conversion for  that period.
The  CRP  data  suggest  that  when  farmers
in  the  South  are  given  an  option,  most  will
choose  to  convert  their  land  from  crop  pro-
duction to  trees.  This result is most likely in-
fluenced  by  the  presence  of  a  strong  timber
industry,  thus  giving  landowners  the  oppor-
tunity  to  gain  additional  profit  from the  land
by harvesting  its timber. Clearly, they may not
get  the  same  opportunity  under  a  carbon  se-
questration  program.  While  it  is  difficult  to
draw  any  strong  conclusions  from  the  CRP
rental  rates  as  to  the  possible  costs  of con-
verting land to carbon sequestering forests, the
rental  values  are  in  the  range  of other  esti-
mates of the marginal cost for forestland con-
version.
Further  insight  into  the  relative  land  con-
version  costs  of  the  South  can  be  found  in
those  studies  that  have  taken  a  regional  per-
spective.  Although  the Moulton  and Richards
study  is  somewhat  dated  and  has  been  criti-
cized  for overestimating  carbon  sequestration
potential, the regional comparisons  of relative
carbon sequestration potential  and costs in the
study  should  still be  valid.  Results  from their
study show the South to have a lower per-unit
average  cost  for  sequestering  more  carbon,
with values  about 30 percent  less per ton than
the  rest  of  the  US.  In  contrast,  Plantinga,
Mauldin,  and  Miller's  results  suggest that the
marginal costs of afforestation  in the South (as
represented  by  S.  Carolina)  are  not  substan-
tially  lower  than  costs  in  the  Midwest  (Wis-
consin)  and  East  (Maine).  The  Adams  et al.
(1999)  study  finds  that  when  more  complete
cost estimates  are considered  (measuring  cost
as  the  net  change  in  producer  and  consumer
surpluses  for both forest and agricultural mar-
kets),  an  afforestation  program  would  cost
more in  the South than in  the North.
The  South  would probably  have  a  unique
advantage  in  a  market  that  rewarded  estab-
lished forest  carbon  sinks.  In  the  South,  pri-
vate  owners  control  almost  90 percent  of the
region's forests, compared to 58 percent  in the
US  (Moulton and Birch).  Over half of the pri-
vate forests  are  less than  10  acres  and almost
90 percent are less than 50 acres (Moulton and
Birch).  The  fact that many of the private for-
ests  are  relatively  small  suggests  that the for-
ests  are  not significant  sources  of income  for
the  owners.  Indeed,  private  forest  owners  in
the  South  are  primarily  white-collar  workers,
retirees,  or  blue-collar  workers;  very  few  are
farmers  (Moulton  and  Birch).  A  national  sur-
vey  of  forest  owners  (Moulton  and  Birch)
asked  for  the  primary  reason  behind  their
ownership  of  forestland.  Thirty-eight  percent
of  southern  owners  replied that it was part  of
their  residence  or farm,  making this  the most
common reply.  Only  12 percent stated that in-
vestment  was  their  primary  incentive  while
even  fewer  (4  percent)  listed  timber  produc-
tion  (Moulton  and  Birch).  Thus,  many forest
owners  in the South may  be willing to enter a
carbon  sequestration program  and forego pos-
sible harvesting revenues  at a lower price than
more  profit-oriented  landowners  elsewhere  in
the nation.
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Conservation Tillage Adoption
Estimates  of soil sequestration  costs on active
agricultural  cropland  are  sparse.  Clearly,  mil-
lions  of  metric  tons  of  carbon  are  being  se-
questered  at no cost,  since many farmers have
already  adopted  conservation  tillage practices.
Babcock  and  Pautsch  report  cost  estimates
ranging  from  $0  to  $400  per  ton  of  carbon
sequestered through conservation  tillage (min-
imum  and  no-till)  on  cropland  in  12  Mid-
western  states.  The  costs  increase  as  soil car-
bon  stocks  continue  to  accumulate  (i.e.,  the
first carbon  stores  are  the cheapest).  This  is a
fairly  intuitive  result  since,  as  mentioned
above,  soil carbon  accumulation rates  slow as
more  carbon  is  stored.  As  with  land  conver-
sion,  increasing  marginal  costs seem to be ev-
ident in this type  of carbon sequestration pro-
gram  as  well.
There  is clearly  a joint product for farmers
to  consider  when  analyzing  the  decision  to
adopt  conservation  tillage.  Conservation  till-
age and other BMPs are likely to reward farm-
ers with higher marginal profits, even without
carbon  sequestration,  since  they  tend  to  in-
crease  agronomic  productivity  (i.e.,  crop
yields)  and decrease  the costs  associated with
erosion,  irrigation,  and  nutrient  control  (Day,
et al.,  Lal  et al.,  McCarl,  Gowen,  and  Yeats;
Tweeten,  Sohngen,  and  Hopkins).  However,
the variability  of farm profits is  also increased
under  these  practices,  which  may  diminish
their  appeal  for  risk-averse  farmers  (McCarl
and  Schneider).
The Bottom Line
Farmers  could potentially  reap  significant  re-
turns  from  a  carbon  sequestration  market,  es-
pecially  given  the joint product of carbon  se-
questration  and  crop  production.  If  farmers
were paid $30 per ton, sequestering  200 MMT
of carbon  per year  could add  $6 billion to the
gross  income  of the  farm  sector  (Sandor  and
Skees).  The net impact of limiting  GHG emis-
sions on  the  agricultural  sector,  however,  also
needs  to be  considered.  Several  studies  have
examined  this  issue,  arguing  that GHG  regu-
lations  will  lead  to  higher  energy  prices  and,
thus,  higher  production  costs,  bringing  down
net farm income (Francl;  McCarl, Gowen  and
Yeats).  A recent USDA study contradicts these
earlier findings and reports  an insignificant im-
pact on the net cash returns  for producers (Of-
fice of the Chief Economist).
Implementation  Issues:  Efficiency  and
Equity Challenges
The  remainder  of  this  paper  deals  more  di-
rectly  with  the  impediments  facing  the  crea-
tion  of an efficient  and equitable  carbon mar-
ket.  The  most  fundamental  barriers  can  be
grouped  into three  broad  areas:  1) transaction
costs,  2)  risk,  and  3)  perverse  incentives.  Ef-
ficient markets  are characterized by minimized
transaction costs,  adequate monitoring  and en-
forcement,  and  sufficient  trading  volume
(Hahn  and Stavins).
Transaction Costs
All  costs  of trade,  including  transaction  costs,
must  be  analyzed  and  minimized  to  achieve
an  efficient  market  for  carbon.  The  primary
costs  surrounding  the  actual  transaction  of  a
permit  trade are  those  associated  with search-
ing, bargaining, monitoring, regulation and en-
forcement.  The  reliability of carbon  measure-
ment,  as  discussed  above,  may  not  be  as
significant  as  others  have  made  it out  to  be;
the  costs  associated  with  measurement  and
verification,  however, are the bigger issue.  Ob-
viously  measurement  costs  decrease  as  the
number of measurements  declines.  Thus, mak-
ing  estimates  for  large  areas  based  on  a  few
measurements  may help minimize  costs but at
the  expense  of  reliability.  The  transaction
costs of measurement  are positively correlated
with accuracy  and reliability.  However, as not-
ed  above,  some  degree  of inaccuracy  due  to
generalization can be tolerated in a market and
not lead to  great inefficiency.
The  measurement  required  to  establish  a
baseline that reflects  current carbon stores has
been  cited  as  a  source  of  significant  transac-
tion  costs  in  other  studies  (Sedjo,  Sohngen,
and  Jagger).  It  seems,  however,  that  periodic
surveys  of land-use  and management  practice
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changes could be undertaken  at fairly low cost
if current  technology  (e.g.,  GIS)  and  survey
work were utilized.  This  assumes that it is the
change  in  carbon  levels  rather  than  the  total
carbon  storage  estimate  that  is  at  issue.  Al-
though the periodic estimates may not be com-
pletely  precise,  they  may  be  sufficient  and
even  unnecessary  if  the  right  market  incen-
tives are  in place.
The  transaction  costs  associated  with bar-
gaining  (i.e.,  the  trading  process  between
agents)  could  be  high when  dealing  with the
agriculture  sector since  there are  many poten-
tial  sellers  of very  small  amounts  of carbon.
This  is a  significant issue for  the forest  sector
and,  thus,  the  South.  The  USDA  Forest  Ser-
vice  projects  that  by  2010  privately  owned
(non-industry)  forests will account for  18 per-
cent  of  all  US  forest  carbon  sequestration
(Birdsey  and  Heath).  This  estimate  would
probably be much higher for the South,  since,
as previously noted, private owners  control al-
most all of the region's forests.  Although these
private  forest owners  could take advantage of
a  carbon  market,  the  transaction  costs  for  a
firm wanting to purchase carbon offsets would
be high.  Since the vast majority of private for-
ests  in  the  South  are  less  than  50  acres,  the
firm would  probably have  to purchase carbon
sequestration rights  from a substantial number
of individuals  to  achieve  a  sufficient  quantity
of carbon offsets.
Risk
Risk can greatly  reduce the trading volume in
a  tradable permit market,  leading  to thin mar-
kets  and  sub-optimal  market  clearing  prices
(McCann).  In addition  to the risk of measure-
ment  error,  the  carbon  market  literature  also
stresses  the  significant  challenges  posed  by
political  risk  (i.e.,  the  risk  that  national  and
international  agencies  will  not  impose  any
CO2  emission  reduction  regulations,  thus  ne-
gating  the  economic  value  of carbon  sinks).
While  political  risk  is  an  important  factor to
consider in any environmental  market,  the fact
that  numerous  companies  and  governments
are forging  ahead  with carbon trades  suggests
the  market  challenge  of  this  risk,  like  mea-
surement  risk,  may  be  overstated  (especially
for  a domestic  market).  The potential  rewards
(in  terms  of  less  future  regulation  penalties,
better  company  image,  and  potential  trading
gains)  and  costs  for most  companies  seem to
more  than  compensate  for  the  political  risk.
The more serious challenges are the risks land-
owners face when changing land-use and man-
agement  practices  and  carbon  "yield"  risk.
These  two  risks  could  seriously  limit  land-
owner  participation  in  a  carbon  market
(McCarl  and Schneider).
The  profit  risk  landowners  face  from
changing  land-use  and  management  practices
may inhibit their participation in a carbon mar-
ket,  especially  if  carbon  prices  are  low.  The
revenue  uncertainty  arising  from  converting
agriculture  land  to  forest  is  amplified  by  the
irreversibility of the decision.  In fact, if carbon
prices  are  fairly  certain,  the  irreversibility  of
the  decision  (and  thus  the  loss  of potentially
high  agricultural  gains)  will  be  the  primary
source  of  risk.  The  risk  farmers  face  from
changing  cultivation  practices  results  from
yield  (and ultimately profit)  variability (Day et
al.,  McCarl  and  Schneider).  Studies  have
found that farmers  view risk as a major factor
in  not  using  BMPs,  even  though  they  have
proven  to generate operating cost savings. One
study  found  that  farmers  perceive  the  risk of
changing their practices to exceed $40 per acre
(Feather and Cooper).  Again, with less certain
farm  profits,  a farmer's  willingness  to partici-
pate  in a carbon  market decreases.
Both  sellers  (e.g.,  farmers)  and  buyers
(e.g.,  carbon emitting  firms)  of carbon  reduc-
tion units also face  carbon  yield risk.  Carbon
yield  refers  to  the  actual  level  of  carbon  se-
questered.  Expectations  of  future  carbon  se-
questration levels  will have to be based on es-
timates,  which  are  subject  to  sampling,
modeling,  and  estimation  error  (EPA).  Some
carbon  sequestration  dynamics  are  still  not
clearly understood,  as  it is  a complex  process
(Sedjo, Sohngen,  and Jagger).  Further,  as with
crops there  is no  guarantee  that a  certain car-
bon level, or yield, will be obtained  since nu-
merous  variables  can  affect  the  carbon  se-
questration  process.  For example,  events such
as  hurricanes  or extreme  rainfall  events  may
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cause major setbacks  in building a carbon sink
(Moulton and Kelly).  This may be particularly
true  in the case of forest carbon  sequestration,
where  large  tracts  of forest can  be  decimated
by  fires,  hurricanes,  etc.  The  challenge  to  the
efficiency  of a  carbon  market  is its  ability  to
find  a  price  that  attracts  enough  participants
(i.e.,  the reward  outweighs  the risks)  to avoid
a  thin  market  and  yet keep  the  total  costs  of
the market below that of a command-and-con-
trol  type  of effort.
Perverse Incentives
Some landowners  have changed farming  prac-
tices  or made  land  conversions  that  have  un-
intentionally  resulted  in  increased  carbon  on
their  land.  It  is  logical  to  assume  that  these
individuals  made  rational  decisions  and  are
thus  being  rewarded  for  their  actions,  most
likely by increased profits (or at least expected
profits).  Perhaps  the  greatest  challenge  for  a
carbon  market  is to  avoid creating  incentives
to  reverse  previous  actions.  As  discussed
above, rewarding  carbon accumulation instead
of established carbon  sinks creates a motive  to
release  "old"  stored  carbon  to  gain  greater
carbon  sequestration  potential.  To  avoid  per-
verse  incentives,  carbon  sequestration  pro-
grams  will  have  to  be  carefully  constructed,
balancing  long-term  and  short-run  goals.  For
example,  a  two-tier  pricing  structure,  one for
stored  carbon  and  one  for  newly  sequestered
carbon,  could  be implemented.  Market forces,
reflecting  the relative  value of short-term  and
long-term  environmental  goals,  would  deter-
mine  the  equilibrium  price  differential  be-
tween  the two.  As  an  alternative,  a  one-time
payment  (most  likely  made  by  the  govern-
ment)  could  be  made  to  all  those  with  sub-
stantial  carbon  sinks.  The  discounted,  annu-
alized  value  of  this  payment  would  clearly
have  to exceed  annual  payment rates  for car-
bon accumulation.  Penalties  or reimbursement
conditions for intentional  carbon release  could
be  built  into  such  a  system  if  the  land  re-
mained  in private  hands  (this  would require  a
baseline estimate of established carbon  stores)
or  the  government  could  purchase  the  land
outright  (McCarl).
Rewarding  established  carbon  sinks, how-
ever,  creates  another  set  of  problems:  rent-
seeking  opportunities  and  equity  issues.  It  is
probable  that some landowners  will seek pay-
ment  for  actions  they  would  have  had  no  in-
tention  of making (e.g.,  cutting  down trees  or
tilling  their  soil)  (McCarl  and  Schneider).
Such rent-seeking  activity  creates inflated car-
bon  market  costs.  Further,  owners  of  larger
tracts  of  land  will  clearly  have  rent-seeking
advantages,  since  more  carbon  would  be  at
risk  and  they  would  have  more  political
weight in  their region.
Addressing the Challenges
Appropriate  institutional  designs  will  be  re-
quired to address  the challenges of transaction
costs,  risk,  and perverse  incentives,  otherwise
the benefits  of a  market-based  approach  may
be  overestimated  (Hahn  and  Stavins,  1992;
Stavins,  1995;  McCann).  This topic has  been
addressed in a few notable studies, but without
much  specific recognition  of farmers'  partici-
pation  (Lee;  Fischer,  Kerr,  and  Toman.;  Hahn
and  Stavins;  McCann).  While  the  challenges
addressed  above  are  significant,  they  are  not
insurmountable.
Some farmers are  already participating  in a
carbon  emission  trading  market.  IGF  Insur-
ance Company,  the fourth  largest crop insurer
in the  US,  has  partnered  with CQuest,  a  firm
that helps implement carbon credit trades (i.e.,
by monitoring, measuring,  registering, etc.), to
sell  carbon  emission  reduction  credits
(CERC).  Each CERC  is the equivalent of one
metric  ton of atmospheric  CO2 reduced or pre-
vented from  an agreed baseline (Caspers-Sim-
met).  These  two companies  have initially  so-
licited  carbon  credits  from  farmers  and
landowners  in  Iowa,  using  IGF's  crop  insur-
ance  agents'  network.  Farmers  and landown-
ers can  achieve  CERCs  from the use  of min-
imum  and  no-till,  cropland  retirement,  buffer
strips, reforestation,  improved timber manage-
ment,  power  generation  from  biomass,  and
methane abatement  from livestock waste (Cas-
pers-Simmet).  The  companies  use  formulas
developed  by  the  USDA  Natural  Resources
Conservation  Service  (NRCS)  to  calculate
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how  much  carbon  is  sequestered  under  alter-
native  conservation  practices.  Price is negoti-
ated  independently  for  each  contract.  They
have  already  sold  2.8  million  metric  tons of
carbon credits to a Canadian consortium of re-
gional  power utilities (PRNewswire).
The  IGF-CQUEST  arrangement  offers  a
working  model  to consider.  IGF is serving  as
a monitor  of farm-level  activities,  thereby de-
creasing  transaction  costs.  Since IGF is an in-
surance  company,  they  understand  the  prob-
lems of moral  hazard and monitoring  farmers.
On the farms to which they sell insurance  they
have important prior information. Further,  they
have  partnered  with  the  NRCS,  which  has
farm-level  conservation  plans  and  models  to
estimate  and verify carbon  sequestration.  This
further  reduces  transaction  costs.  IGF  is  also
developing  new  insurance  contracts  that  will
decrease  the risk  farmers  face  when adopting
management  practices  to  help  sequester  car-
bon.  For example,  cold  soils in  the spring are
an  impediment  to  adopting  reduced  tillage,
since  tilling  the  soil  helps  it  warm  faster.  To
offset  this  risk,  IGF  is  offering  an  insurance
contract  that  pays  farmers  when  spring  tem-
peratures  are  significantly  below  average.
As illustrated  by the IGF example, the right
institutions  can  facilitate cost-effective  trades.
However,  since  IGF  seems  to  be  negotiating
contracts  on  an individual  basis,  they are  still
facing  significant  transaction  costs.  These
transaction  costs  could be  drastically  reduced
if  some  type  of  organization  were  created  to
act as an  aggregator of individual landowners,
thus  serving  as  the  link between  landowners
and the larger  CO2 market.  A farmer/forester-
owned  organization,  such  as  a  cooperative,
could prove to be the best model for this type
of  organization.  It  would  aggregate  smaller
landowners  into  a  single  organization  large
enough  to  trade  more  effectively  (faster  and
more  efficient  transactions)  and perhaps  more
equitably  with other agents in the market.  The
landowners  would  also  capture  the  broker's
share  of profits,  which  could increase  market
participation  at  lower  permit  prices.  Such  an
organization  would  also  solve  some  monitor-
ing  and moral hazard  issues.  Since  each land-
owner's  profits  are  tied  to  those of the  orga-
nization,  the incentive  to cheat  is diminished.
Furthermore,  measurement  and  carbon
"yield"  risk  could be  avoided  at  a fairly  low
cost.  For  example,  ten  farmers  may  estimate
that collectively  they  will be able to sequester
1,000  tons  of carbon  over a  five-year  period.
To  be  safe,  however,  they  may  only  sell  900
tons of carbon to account for any possible dis-
crepancies  due to measurement inaccuracies or
poor soil  performance.  The  cost  to each indi-
vidual  for  contracting  a  lower-than-expected
carbon yield  would be marginal.  In  some cas-
es,  insurance  contracts  on  extreme  weather
events may be a more efficient means to hedge
against  some  of the  risk  associated  with  car-
bon yields.
The  IGF  example  also suggests  an  appro-
priate role for government  in  a carbon market
beyond  acting  as  regulator  (i.e.,  farm-level
monitor)  and  the  agency  that  could  fill  that
role  (the  NRCS).  Government  actions  could
clearly  either  help  or  hinder  the  evolution  of
an efficient  and equitable  carbon market.  The
Conservation  Reserve  Program has been used
in  some  studies  as  a  model  for  a  carbon  se-
questration  program  (Plantinga,  Mauldin,  and
Miller;  Parks  and  Hardie).  With  this  type  of
system,  the government would pay  farmers to
sequester  carbon.  Although  the  US  govern-
ment has effectively  undertaken  similar initia-
tives  in  the  past  (the  CRP  and  Wetland  Re-
serves  Program),  this  type  of  system  could
crowd  out private  sector  market development.
A  more efficient  use of government resources
would  be  to  collect,  maintain  and  distribute
updated  and  comprehensive  data  and  infor-
mation  about land  use  and  carbon  sequestra-
tion estimates to market agents. This provision
of  free,  unbiased  information  could  signifi-
cantly  reduce  some  market  transaction  costs
and risks.
Conclusion
A  tradable  permit  market  for  CO2 is  already
more of a reality than an idea. Agriculture can
take  advantage  of  such  market  opportunities
by  sequestering  carbon  through  land  conver-
sion (afforestation)  and  greater use  of conser-
vation  tillage.  Some farmers  in  Iowa have  al-
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ready been paid  for their conservation  efforts.
Regional  differences  in agriculture  and forest-
ry will  foster  different  carbon  market interac-
tions  among  US  landowners.  Farmers  in  the
South could benefit from both converting  their
marginal  land  to  forests  and  adopting  no-till.
The  carbon  sequestration  rate  for  typical
Southern  forests  is  greater than  in  most other
regions  in  the  US.  Also,  the  level  of no-till
adoption  is  lower  than  the  national  average.
However,  the  characteristics  that  give  the
South  an  advantage  in terms  of future  carbon
sequestration  potential  would  give  the region
a  distinct  disadvantage  in  a  program  that re-
warded established  carbon sinks.  The typically
smaller  landholdings  in  the  South,  especially
in  the  forest  sector,  could  also  inhibit  land-
owner participation  in  a carbon  market.
These  and  other  challenges  (transaction
costs,  risk,  and perverse incentives)  are, how-
ever,  surmountable.  For example,  the  creation
of  a  cooperative  could  reduce  some  transac-
tion costs, help manage risk, and increase mar-
ket participation  of agricultural  agents  by  act-
ing as  an aggregator of small landowners.  The
government  could  increase  market  efficiency
by acting  as  a  source  of free,  unbiased  infor-
mation  on  land  use  and  carbon  sequestration
estimates.  Certainly,  many other market details
and issues  need to be resolved,  but the carbon
market  seems like a significant opportunity for
the  agricultural  sector.  The efforts  of research
need  to  be  focused  towards  finding  optimal
institutional  arrangements  for  agricultural
agents.
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